University of Texas at El Paso

ScholarWorks@UTEP
Departmental Technical Reports (CS)

Computer Science

9-2020

Does Transition to Democracy Lead to Chaos: A Theorem
Olga Kosheleva
The University of Texas at El Paso, olgak@utep.edu

Vladik Kreinovich
The University of Texas at El Paso, vladik@utep.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utep.edu/cs_techrep
Part of the Applied Mathematics Commons

Comments:
Technical Report: UTEP-CS-20-96
Recommended Citation
Kosheleva, Olga and Kreinovich, Vladik, "Does Transition to Democracy Lead to Chaos: A Theorem"
(2020). Departmental Technical Reports (CS). 1491.
https://scholarworks.utep.edu/cs_techrep/1491

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science at ScholarWorks@UTEP. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Departmental Technical Reports (CS) by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UTEP. For more information, please contact lweber@utep.edu.

Does Transition to Democracy Lead to Chaos:
A Theorem
Olga Kosheleva and Vladik Kreinovich
University of Texas at El Paso
500 W. University
El Paso, TX 79968, USA
olgak@utep.edu, vladik@utep.edu
Abstract
When a country transitions to democracy, at first, many political parties appear. A natural question is whether the number of such parties
feasible and reasonable – or whether this is a complete chaos. In this
paper, we formulate a simplified version of this question in precise terms
and show that the number of parties will be feasible – i.e., that transition
to democracy does not lead to chaos.

1

What Happens During Transition to Democracy

Before the transition. Before the transition, only a relatively small number
of people can affect what is happening in the country. The corresponding group
of people may change, one group may overthrow and replace another one – but
at any given moment of time, in any specific situation, only a small group of
people decides.
Others have no power to change anything. To be more precise, each of
them cannot change anything on his/her own. If many people were able to get
together, they would be able to change the society – but they are prevented by
the powers-to-be from acting together.
Then, the transition comes. Eventually, in spite of the oppression, people
get together, overthrow the oppressive regime, and establish democracy.
Does it lead to chaos? After the transition to democracy, many different
interest groups form their own political parties or factions. As a result, we have
a huge number of different political players – many more than in well established
democracies.
An important question is: does this transition lead to a somewhat large but
still reasonable and feasible number of parties – or does it leads to a non-feasible,
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unreasonably large number, i.e., to chaos, and the only thing we can do is wait
for a more feasible political structure to emerge?
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we formulate this question in
precise terms; of course, as usual with formalizations, this becomes possible if
we simplify the situation.
Then, by analyzing this precise (simplified) model, we produce an answer
to this question. The answer is: no, transition to democracy does not lead to
chaos.

2

Towards the Formulation of the Problem in
Precise Terms: A Simplified Model

Let us simplify the situation. In real life, we have a whole spectrum of
decisions. In general, each decision means selecting one of many possible alternatives. The simplest possible decisions are when we only have two alternatives
to select from, e.g. when we either approve some change or not. We can describe each such a decision by a propositional (= boolean = yes-no = true-false)
variable d.
This country-affecting decision is based on the opinions and actions of all
the people of the country. Again, in general, each person can perform many
different actions and can have many different opinions. The simplest possible
case is when each person has only two choices of action – e.g., to act in a certain
way or not. Thus, in this simplified model, the action of the i-th person can be
also described by a propositional variable ai .
The overall country-wide decision is determined by all these actions, i.e., by
the values of all these variables a1 , . . . , an , where n is the number of people in
the country. Let us denote the decision corresponding to the tuple (a1 , . . . , an )
by f (a1 , . . . , an ). In mathematical terms, this means that we have a function
that assigns a Boolean value to each such tuple.
What does absence of democracy means in these terms. As we mentioned earlier, the absence of democracy means that only a few people can affect
the resulting decision when acting on their own. Let m  n be the overall number of such decision-affecting people.
The ability of the i-th person to change a decision means that if this person
changes his/her action ai to the opposite one ¬ai , then the decision will change,
i.e., that we will have
f (a1 , . . . , ai−1 , ¬ai , ai+1 , . . . , an ) 6= f (a1 , . . . , ai−1 , ai , ai+1 , . . . , an ).

(1)

So, the absence of democracy means that for each tuple (a1 , . . . , an ), there are
no more than m indices i for which the inequality (1) is satisfied.
What happens after the transition to democracy. After this transition,
people start forming political parties. In precise terms, this means that in
the set {1, . . . , n} of all the people, several mutually disjoint groups g1 , . . . , gc
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are formed. Of course, for each situation (a1 , . . . , an ), it makes sense to only
consider parties that have some influence, i.e., parties gj for which some change
of the corresponding values ai for i ∈ gj can change the decision f (a1 , . . . , an ).
The question is: will the number c of such parties feasible?
How to formalize what is feasible. In theoretical computer science, there is
a formalization of feasible, which applies to feasible computation time (= number of computational steps), feasible length (= number of symbols) of the answer, feasible number of processors, etc. Namely, a number is called feasible if
it is bounded by a polynomial of the input. This is not a perfect formalization,
but it is the best one available; see, e.g., [1, 4, 5, 6].
Now, we can formulate the question in precise terms.
Formulation of the question in precise terms. Does there exist a polynomial P (m) such that for every function f (a1 , . . . , an ):
• if for each tuple (a1 , . . . , an ), no more than m indices have the property (1),
• then for each tuple, we can have no more than P (m) disjoint sets
g1 , . . . , gj , . . . ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
for which , for each j, some change of the values ai for i ∈ gj can change
the decision f (a1 , . . . , an ).
Comment. In our formalization:
• If such a polynomial exists, this means that the situation is feasible.
• If no such polynomial exists, then transition to democracy can indeed lead
to a non-feasible number of political parties, i.e., to chaos.

3

Solution of the Problem

The solution to this precisely formulated problem is known. Interestingly, the solution to the above question is known. To explain this solution, let
us introduce a few definitions.
For any boolean function f (a1 , . . . , an ) and for any tuple a = (a1 , . . . , an ),
the number of indices i for which the inequality (1) holds is known as the
sensitivity of f at a. For each boolean function f (a1 , . . . , an ), its sensitivity
s(f ) is defined as the largest of the sensitivities at different tuples. In these
terms, the condition of the question is that s(f ) ≤ m.
For any boolean function f (a1 , . . . , an ) and for any tuple a = (a1 , . . . , an ),
the largest number c of disjoint sets g1 , . . . , gj , . . . ⊆ {1, . . . , n} for which,
for each j, some change of the values ai for i ∈ gj can change the decision
f (a1 , . . . , an ) is known as the block sensitivity of f at a. For each boolean
function f (a1 , . . . , an ), its block sensitivity bs(f ) is defined as the largest of the
sensitivities at different tuples.
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In these terms, the question is whether there exists a polynomial P (m) for
which, for all boolean function f (a1 , . . . , an ), we have bs(f ) ≤ P (s(f )). The
hypothesis that such a polynomial exists is known as the sensitivity hypothesis.
This hypothesis was an open problem for more than 30 years, but in 2019, it
was proven to be true; see [2, 3].
Conclusion. Transition to democracy does not lead to chaos – at least within
our simplified model.
Open problem. What will happen if we introduce a more complex – and
more realistic – formalization of the question, e.g., by allowing each participant
to have several possible actions?
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